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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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Record No. 1761 
C. D. TERRY, ADMINISTRATOR OF TALMAGE P. 
TAYLOR, DECEASED, Appellant, 
Vef"SUS 
G. M. ROGERS, ADMINISTRATOR OF SAMUEL R. TAY-
LOR, DECEASED, .AND OTHER8, Appellees. 
PETITION. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: . 
Your petitioner,. C. D. Terry, as Administrator of the estate 
of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, respectfully represents that 
he is aggrieved at certain rulings of the Circuit Conrt of 
Buckingham County, on the trial of and by the final decree 
of said Court entered on the loth da.y of December, 1935, in 
a certain suit in chancery lately pending therein, wherein 
G. M. Rogers,. Administrator of Samuel R. Taylor, deee~sed, 
was complainant, and Charles R. Taylor, William A. 'Faylor, 
Maggie E. Giannotti (nee Taylor), ViTgie V. Taylor, Lewis 
Williams,. E;x.ecntor of 0. I. Tayio:r, deceased, 0. D·. Terry, 
Administrator of Talmage P. Tay~0r, deceased, Frances M. 
Taylor and Margie E. Taylor, the last named being an infant 
under the age of twenty-one yea.rs,. were defendants. 
· Your-petitioner presents- herewith a transcript of the record 
in said cause, from which it appears tn~t this court has 
jurisdiction, and which yom- petitioner prays may be read 
along with this his petition. 
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Your petitioner ,further avers that he mailed a copy of 
this his petit,ion to G. l\L Rogers, the opposing counsel in the 
trial court, on February 7th, 1936, and your petitioner here 
files with his petition his brief of authorities in support of 
his contentions herein, and which contains a fair statement of 
the facts, as required by the rules of this court, and which 
said brief is signed by his counsel, along with this petition, 
and he here adopts the same as his brief in this case. 
I. 
NATURE OF _SUIT, ISSUES' AND DECISION. 
This was a suit in chancery instituted by proper writs in 
the Circuit Court of Buckingham County, Virginia, for the. 
purpose of directing the administration of the personal estate 
of Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, and the settlement of the ac-
counts of the Administrator of said estate under the direction 
of the court. The bill of complaint alleges that Samuel R. 
Taylor, the plai~tiff's decedent, died unmarried, a legal resi-
dent of the County of Buckingham, on the 30th day of Sep-
tember, 1918, while in the active service of the United States 
Navy in the World War; that a.t the time of his death the 
decedent carried War ·Risk Insurance in the sum of $10,-
000.00, designating his father, C. I. Taylor, as his sole bene-
ficiary; that C. I. Taylor died on July 28, 1920. At the time 
of tl}.e death of the veteran, Samuel R. Taylor, he left sur-
viving him his father, C. I. Taylor, his whole brother, Tal-
mage P. Taylor, his two half-brothers, Charles R. Taylor 
··and William A. Taylor, and his half-sister, Maggie E. Gian-
notti; that at the time of the death of the father the two 
hundred and forty monthly payments, as provided by the War 
Risk Insurance Act, had not been paid, and that from July 
30, 1920, to March 29, 1934, the date of the death of Tal-
mage P. Taylor, $23.00 a month was awarded and paid to 
Talmage P. Taylor direct, and $11.50 to each of the half-
brothers and half-sister; that these half-brothers and half-
sister are still receiving tl1e $11.50, but that the commuted 
value of the share of Talmage P. Taylor of $1,152.00, which 
has been paid to the Administrator, plaintiff, as the share 
of Talmage P. Taylor, is now in the hands of the Administra-
tor for administration. 
At the time of his death the father, C. I. Taylor, left a last 
will and testament whereby he gave to his wife, Virgie E. 
Taylor, one-third of all of his personal property, and the re-
mainder to Charles R. Taylor and William A. Taylor and 
Maggie E. Taylor (who is now Maggie E. Giannotti), and 
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named Lewis Williams as his sole Executor; that there were 
no other children born to C. I. Taylor; that the said Tal-
mage P. Taylor died on March 24, 1934, intestate, leaving his 
widow, Frances M. Taylor, and one child, Margie E. Taylor, 
and that your petitioner, C. D. Terry, has been duly ap-
pointed and qualified as Administrator of Talmage P. Tay-
lor, deceased. The will of Clifford I. Taylor is exhibited 
with the bill of complaint. It appears that this will was 
executed on the 9th day of January, 1907, wherein the said 
C. I. Taylor bequeathed to his three youngest children, 1\tLag-
gie E. Taylor, William Alton Taylor and Charles Richard 
Taylor, and any other children tha.t may be born by union 
in marriage with his presel}t wife, Virgie E. Taylor, all of 
his property of every description, including money, bonds of 
every class and description, and from all sources whatever, 
including life insuranc~, if there be any in force at the time 
of his death, to the said children share and share alike, naming 
Lewis Williams, Executor·; and that the said Executor allow 
the household furniture to remain in the possession of his 
~aid wife, Virgie E. 'J~a.ylor, until the youngest child becomes 
of age; providing, however, that if said Executor finds it 
necessary to use any of the money of the estate for the sup-
port of testator's children he may use such sums from time 
to time as he may deem just and reasonable. He also wills 
to his sons, Samuel R. Taylor and Talmage P. Taylor, $1.00 
each, reciting that he has heretofore deeded to his two oldest 
sons his real estate on 'vhich he now lives, as evidenced by 
deed of conveyance. By codicil of July 28, 1919, the said 
Clifford I. Taylor changes the provisions of his will to the 
extent that he provides that his wife, \Tirgie E. Taylor, shall 
have one-third interest in all of the testator's property, in 
fee simple to her, and the remaining portion· of his property 
to pass as set forth in the original will, stating, "I am also 
impressed under the law my wife 'vould be entitled to this 
share of my estate if it were not in writing''· 
· Your petitioner appeared and answered this bill of com-
plaint, admitting the facts as set forth in the said bill, but 
denying that the said C. I. Taylor could dispose of the com-
muted insurance of the estate of Samuel R. Taylor; that the 
sum of $1,152.00 in the hands of the Administrator 'vas out of 
the commuted interest of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, and 
that this amount should go to the heirs of Talmage P. Ta.ylor, 
who are his wife and infant daughter. He exhibits the award 
of the Wa.r Risk Insurance money to the said Talmage P. Tay-
. lor, and contends that the plaintiff Administrator should pay 
the said amount to him as Administrator of Talmage P. Tay-
lor, deceased. 
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On this issue as to the true disposition of the said com-
muted amount of $1,152.00 the Circuit Court of Buckingham 
County by its final decree of December 10, 1935, denied this 
petitioner's claim, decided tha.t the $1,152.00 passed under 
- the Will of Clifford I. Taylor, deceased, and should be paid 
to the Executor under his will, and that the plaintiff Adinillis-
trator, after deducting certain costs and attorneys' fees 
awarded, do pay the residue to the beneficiaries under the 
will of C. I. Taylor, deceased, it appearing that Lewis Wil-
liams, the Executor, does not desire to receive the money 
himself as such, he already having settled his accounts as 
such Executor, and the surety on his bond having been dis;.. 
charged from any further liability. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The facts are not in dispute, and are as set forth in the 
pleadings herein as· above stated .. The sole question is as tQ 
whether the $1,152.00 should be administered tinder the will 
of C. I. Taylor, deceased, as a part of his estate, or whether 
it should be administered as the estate of Samuel R. Taylor, 
and the share of Talmage P. Taylor go to his widow and 
infant child, and to the half-brothers and half-sister; and also 
accounting for the amounts· they have been receiving as their 
part of the estate of the said Samuel R. Taylor, deceased. 
Ill. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Petitioner respectfully represents that the trial court in 
its final decree erred to the prejudice of this petitioner, and 
accordingly assigns error in the rulings of the trial court in 
the folloWing particulars : 
(1) The court erred in decreeing that the commuted in-
surance should be adminis-tered under the will of Clifford I. 
Taylor, deceased, and should be paid out and distributed in 
aooordan~ with the provisions of said will. 
( 2) The court erred in ruling that the said Clifford I. -
'l'aylor could dispose of the said commuted insurance of the 
estate of Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, by his will. 
( 3) The court erred in refusing to decree the said com-
muted insurance to your petitioner, C. D. Terry, Administra-
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tor, to be administered as. the estate of Taln1age P. Taylor. 
deceased. 
( 4) The court erred in refusing to so decree the said 
$1,152.00 to your petitioner as the estate of Talmage P. Tay-
lor, deceased; and erred in refusing to require the defend-
·ants, Charles R. Taylor, William A. Taylor and Maggie E. 
Giannotti, to account as to the share· of the insuranGe of 
Sam~el R. Taylor, deceased, they were. receiving, and bring 
it into hotchpotch for the correct ascertainment of the amount 
payable to the estate of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased .. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT. 
The assignments of error go to the same question and can 
be considered together. 'J.1he record is brief, and there are no 
disputed facts. 'l'he question is, does the· commuted value of 
$1,152.00 of tl_le estate of Samuel R. Taylor, the. veteran, go 
to the widow and infant child of Talmage P. Taylor, through 
your petitioner as Administrator, or does it go under the will 
of Clifford I. Taylor to the devisees named therein? 
A correct solution of the question harmonizes the holdings 
of the courts and makes the disposition clear and in ac-
cordance with the authorities. 
The original War Risk Insurance Act in effect October 
6, 1917, Section 402, provides as to the beneficiaries: 
''The insurance shall not be assignable, and shall not be 
subject to the claims of creditors of the insured or of the 
. beneficiary. It shall be paya.ble only to a spouse, child, grand-
child, parent, brother or sister, and also during total and 
permanent disability to the injured person, or to any or 
all of them. The insurance shall be payable in two hundred 
and forty equal monthly installments.'' 
By the Act, of ,June 25, 1918, this Section was amended 
to read as follows : 
"The insurance shall be payable only to a spouse, child, 
grandchild, parent, brother, or sister, and also during total 
and permanent disability to the injured person, or to any or 
all of them. The insurance shall be payable in two hundred 
and forty equal monthly· installments." 
By the Act approved December 24, 1919, entitled," An Act 
to Amend and Modify the War Risk Insurance .Act'', Section 
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402 of this Act was amended to enlarg·e the permitted elass 
of beneficiaries as follows : 
"That the permitted class of beneficiaries· for insurance 
as specified in S'ection 402 of the War Risk Insurance Act 
is hereby enlarged so as to include, in addition to the per-
sons therein enumerated, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, 
brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the insured. This section 
shall be deemed to be in effect as of October 6, 1917." 
At the same time the original War Risk Insurance Act as 
to Section 402 was amended by adding another sub-paragraph 
(a) as follows : 
''Where a beneficiary at the time of designation by the· 
insured is within the permitted clas·s of beneficiaries and is 
the designated beneficiary at the time of the maturity of' the 
insurance because of the· death of the insured, such beneficiary 
shall be deemed to be within the permitted class even though 
the status of such beneficiary shall have been changed.'' 
And there was added a new section designated as Section 
407 as' follows : 
Sec. 407. "If no person within the permitted class of 
beneficiaries survive the insured, then there shall be paid 
to the estate of the insured the monthly installments payable 
and applicable under the provisions of Article IV of the War 
Risk_ Insurance _1\ct.'' 
By the Act of June 7, 1924, the War Risk Insurance Act 
was repealed, and there 'vas enacted the World War Veterans' 
.Act, entitled, ''An Act to consolidate, modify, revise and re-
enact the laws affecting the establishment of . the United 
States Veterans' Bureau, and the ad1ninistration of the War 
Risk Insurance Act, as amended, and the Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act, as amended"· Section 303 of that Act provided: 
"If no person within the permitted cl~ss of beneficiaries 
survive the insured, or if before the completion of payments 
the beneficiary or l1eneficiaries shall die and there be no sur-
viving person within said permitted class, then there shall be 
paid to the estate of the insured the present value of the 
monthly installments thereafter payable under the provisions 
of this title. '' 
Section 300 defining the permitted classes provides: 
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''The insurance shall be payable only to a spouse, child, 
grandchild, parent, brother, sister,. uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, 
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, or to any or all of them.'' 
Sections 600 and 601 repeal the former War R.isk Insur-
ance Act, and the amendments thereto, and then follows Sec.: 
tion 602, saving all rights that may have accrued under· the 
former Act, as follows : · 
''The repeal of tJ1e several Acts as provided in Sections 
600 and 601 hereof shall not affect any Act done or any right 
or liability accruing, or apy suit commenced before the said 
repeal, but all such rights and liabilities under said Act shall 
continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said 
repeal had not been made.'' 
By the A.ct of March 4, 1925, Section 303 'vas amended as 
follows: 
"If no person within the permitted class be designated 
as beneficiary for yearly renewable term insurance by the 
insured either in his lifetime or by his last will and testa-
ment or if the designated beneficiary does not survive ·the 
insured or survives the insured and dies prior to receiving 
all of the "two hundred and forty installments or all such 
as are payable and applicable, there shall be paid to the 
est.ate of the insured the present value of the monthly in-
stallments thereafter payable, said value to .be coonputed 
as of the date of last payment made under any existing 
award:. Provided, That all awards· of yearly renewable term 
insurance whi<}h are in course of payme:nt on the date of the 
approval of. this Act shall continue until the death of the pe·r-
son receiving such payments, or until he forfeits same under 
the provisions of this Act. When any person to 'vhom such 
insurance is now awarded dies or forfeits his rights to such 
insurance then there shall be paid to the estate of the insured 
the present value of the remaining unpaid monthly install-
ments of the insurance so awarded to such person: Pro-
vided further, That no award of yearly renewable term in-
surance which has been made to the estate of a last sur-
viving beneficiary shall be affected by-·this amendment: Pro-
vided further, That in cases· when the estate of an insured 
would escheat under the laws of the place of his residence 
the insurance shall not be paid to the estate but shall escheat 
to the United States and be credited to the militarv and naval 
insurance appropriation: This section shall be w deemed to 
be in effect as of October 6, 1917." 
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Section 602 remained as it was in. the Act of 1924, and this 
is the present status of th~ law. 
It is certain tha.t before the repeal of the former Acts up 
to 1924, the beneficiary narned had no vested interest in the 
insurance, and that after his death the remaining installments 
were to be paid to the persons within the permitted class. 
In other words, on the death of the beneficiary the estate 
was then created, and this estate became the channel for 
the distribution of the fund to parties within the permitted 
class, in accordance with the priorities as provided by the 
statutes of the State of the residence of the deceased veteran 
at the time of his death. The sav~ng clause-Section 602-
preserved all those rights, and when the beneficiary died and 
the payments were awarded to the heirs of the veteran then 
1his became a fixed right, the new Act being clearly prospec-
tive with reference to rights that had already accrued. Of 
course, if the veteran was living after the new enactment 
then Congress had a right to pass the Act retroactive as of 
October, 1917, the statute became effective as to such insur-
ance which had been granted under said Act of 1917. Under 
the former Act the decisions are unanimous that the bene-
ficiary had no vested interest. 
Price v. McConnell, et al. (Va.), 149 S. E., pag·e 515. In 
this case the father of the veteran was named beneficiary, 
and at page 516 of the opinion the court said, spea,ldng of 
the father who was the beneficiary, citing a number of au-
thorities: 
"W. H. Price, the beneficiary, took no vested interest in 
the unpaid installments of this insurance.'' 
This is in accord with the authorities with reference to the 
old Act. 
In this case the veteran died in 1918, holding the same 
kind of term insurance policy as in this case. The father, ·as 
beneficiary, drew installments until April, 1924, when he died. 
The remaining installm-ents which would hav-e been eoming 
to the father were commuted and paid to the Administrator 
of the estate of the soldier. The father's widow, who was 
the stepmother of the s·g}dier, claimed her share of the com-
muted insurance a.s provid~d by Section 5273 of the Code, 
hut the court held that this insurance should be distributed 
to the brothers and sisters of the insured of the whole blood 
and half blood, and that the stepmother~ the wife of the de-
ceased father, was not entitled to any part of the distribution 
of the estate of her stepson, Arthur Price. The court, in com-
'menting on the distribution, says: 
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"We think it is too well settled to admit of argul!l.ent that 
the heirs and distributees of any decedent are determined 
as ·of the death of the decedent. This being true, the heirs 
and distributees of Arthur Price entitled to the funds in the 
hands of his administrator are those who 'vould have taken 
the estate at the date of his death had it not been for the life 
estate in these funds by the beneficiary, and Section 303 of 
the World War Veterans' Act, 38 U.S. C. A., Sec. 514, plainly 
makes the remaining unpaid installments the estate of the 
soldier, Arthur Price. It follows that these installments 
should be distributed among his heirs and distributoos as 
of the date of his d-eath, which, in this case, after lhe death 
of hi.s father, the beneficiary, were his brothers and sisters, 
those of the whole blood taking two parts and those of the 
half blood taking one part each, as provided by the statute 
of descents and distrihr~tions of Virginia.'' 
It was further contended that the lower court had deter-
mined the heirs and distributees of the estate of .Artliur 
Price as of the date of the death of th-e father, the bene-
ficiary. · 
The court further says in conclusion: 
''A careful consideration of the decroo of the court does 
not justify this conclusion, and we are of opinion that the 
heirs at law of the insured are to be determined ·at the date 
of his death, and that they, after the life estate of the bene-
ficiary, W. H. Price, are entitled to the undistributed install-
ments of insurance. This being true, the decree of the court, 
malting distribution, is correct, and Ida P. Price, who is 
at present and has since the death of her stepson been draw-
ing installments on her one-half interest in the policy, is not 
entitled to any part of the distribution of this estate of her 
~tepson, Arthur Price.'' 
The case at bar is a stronger case in the protection of the 
rights of the estate of Talmage P. Taylor than in the case 
just cited, because the award had been actually made to 
Talmage P. Taylor in 1921, and his rights had accrued under 
this award, which were saved to him by Section 602 as above 
quoted. 
Therefore, this construction of the stat~te harmonized the 
later aase of Stacey v. Culbertson (Va.), 160 S. E., page 50. 
There the veteran designated his wife and his father as equal 
beneficiaries under the insurance, and they received the in-
stallments until the death of the widow of the soldier. The 
widow died J uiy 29, 1927. The court there held: 
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"Where distributees of deceased soldier's estate were his 
widow and his father, equal beneficiaries under war risk in-
surance, on widow's death her surviving husband and S{)l-
dier's father held entitled to each one-half computed value 
of that which 'vould have been paid soldier's widow.'' 
The court at page 51, in commenting on the reason for its 
decision in this caS€, says: 
''The .act of Congress, as amended, provides that install-
ments of war risk insurance remaining unpaid at the death 
of a beneficiary becmne the estate of the deooased soldier. 
World War Veterans' Act, Section 14 of the amendment of 
March 4, 1925, chapter 553, 43 Stat. at Large 1310, U. S. C., 
title 38, Sec. 514 (38 U. S. C. A., Sec. 514) to Section 303 of 
the Act of June 7, 1924. Cas.es controlled by the statute in 
effect before this amendment are irrelevant in this case. 55 
A. L. R. 594, 597.'' 
And in distinguishing the case of Price v. lJfcConnell, the 
court further says, on the same page : 
"In Price v. JJ!lcCmtnell, 153 Va. 567, 149 S. E. 515, it ap-
pears that the beneficiary (father of the deceased soldier) 
died before the amendment of March 4, 1925, and, therefore, 
Ida B. Price, his 'vidow, was held not to be entitled, because 
not within the class then permitted to share in the distribu-
tion.'' 
See Sin.gleton v. Cheek, 284 U. S. 493-497; 76 L. Ed. 419; 
81 A. L. R. 923. 
One of the best considered cases involving the question a.t 
bar, which distinguishes the rights of the parties before and 
after the enactment of the new statute as it now stands, is 
the case of Hatch, et al., v. U. 8., 29 Fed. (2nd) 213, decided 
by the District Court of the Northern District of New York, 
November 7, 1928. The District Judge who decided this case 
evidently made a thorough investigation of the statute and of 
the authorities. 
There the veteran was granted insurance on or about the 
20th da.y of May, 1918, and he died in the line of duty in 
October, 1918, leaving his mother and father and three 
brothers surviving him. After the veteran's death the Pirec-
tor of War Risk Insurance awarded the insurance to Edward 
Hatch, the father, to Boyd Hatch, Livingstone Hatch and 
VanNote Hatch, his brothers, in monthly installments of 
$14.37 each. By mistake the mother, Jessie B. Hatch, was 
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omitted from the award, but the award to her is not involved 
in this case, as she released her rights. Prior to his entry 
into the military service the insured made his last will and 
testament giving his entire estate 'to his nephews, Livingstone 
Hatch and Payson riatch, in trust until the twenty-first birth-
day of Payson Hatch, when the estate was to be equally 
divided between them, and in the event of death of both 
before the date fixed for distribution the estate passed to 
the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A. · 
The will was submitted to the Bureau of War Risk Insur-
ance, who at first held the devisees named therein as entitled 
to the insurance, but following this on June 28,. 1926, this 
ruling was reversed on the ground that the nephews were 
not within the permitted class, and a\\rarded the payments 
to the father and brothers as above noted, and p~yments were 
being made to them prior to the Act of Jun~ 7, 1924, as 
amended by the Act of March 4, 1925. The question arose 
as· to whether the rights of the parties were. governed by the 
new Act of June, 1924, as amended, or whether by the former 
Acts which were repealed, with t~e saving ~ause, Section 
602, or whether their rights were to be construed with refer-
ence to the former Acts. The court. held: 
Syl. 4--' 'Will of deceased soldier, executed before his entry 
into military service and before his application for war risk 
insurance, by which he gave his entire estate to his nephews, 
held not to constitute designation of _beneficiary of insurance 
moneys payable under certi:fic.ate,.by \Var Risk Insurance Act, 
Oct. 6, 1917, Sec. 402, 40 Stat. 409, as amended by Act, June 
25, 1918, Sec. 21, 40 Stat. 619." 
Syl. 7-"World War Veterans' Act, June 7, 1924, Sec. 303, 
as amended by Act, ~farch 4, 1925, Sec.. 14 (38 U.S. C. A~, Sec; 
514 )~ requiring payment of war risk insurance to estate of 
deceased soldier in lump sum, ·where no beneficiary is desig-
nated, or beneficiary is dead, is prospective, a:nd relates to 
all eases where either the insured or the beneficiary is still 
living." 
Syl. 8-' 'All a"rards of war risk insurance made under pre-
existing law, which "rere in course of payrp.ent on March 4, 
1925, are required to continue until subsequent death of pei·-
son receiving payment of awards, under World War Vete-
rans'. Act, Jl.tne 7, 1924, 8ec. 303, as amended by Act, March 
4, 1925, Sec. 14 (38 U. S. C. A., Sec. 514), at which time they 
become payable to soldier's estate.'' 
· Syl. 9-'' Right of heirs of deceased soldier, within per-
mitted class of beneficiaries, to payment of monthly awards 
of war ris~ insuran~e under· \Var Risk Insurance Act, Oct. 6, 
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1917, Sec. 402, 40 Stat. 409, as amended by Act, June ·25, 1918, 
Sec. 21,. 40 Stat. 615, w·here no beneficiary was designated, 
held not defeated by World War Veterans' Act, June 7, 1924, 
Sec. 303, as a1nen_cled by Act, Ma reb 4, 1925, Sec. 14 ( 38 
Stat. 514), providing in certain cases for payt..nent of award 
in lump sum to estate of deceased soldier, since Act, June 7, 
1924, Sec. 602, 43 Stat. 630, provides that repeal of War 
Risk Insurance Act shall not affect any rights .of liabilities 
which accrued thereunder.'' 
Syl. 10-''World War Veterans' Act, June 7, 1924, Sec. 
303, as amended by A.ct, March 4, 1925, Sec. 14 (38 U. S. 
C. A., Sec. 514), in so far as it provides that section shall 
be deemed in effect as of October 6, 1917, must be construed 
subject to exception of Section 602 ( 43 Stat. 630), preserving 
rights and liabilities accrued under War Risk Insurance Act 
and its amendnients. '' 
Syl.11-"World War Veterans' Act, June 7, 1924, S'ec. 303, 
as amended by Act, March 4, 1925, Sec. 14 (38 U. S. C. A., 
Sec. 514), providing for payment of awards of war risk in~ 
surance to estate of deceased soldier, where no beneficiary· is 
designated or beneficiary is dead, and making provisions of 
section retroactive, held not applicable to rights of persons 
within permitted class of beneficiaries under War Risk In-
surance Act, Oct. 6, 1917, Sec. 402, 40 Stat. 409, as amended 
by Act, June 25, 1918, Sec. 21, 40 Stat. 615, where insured 
died before amendment of Section 303 became effective, since 
Section 602 of the 1924 Act ( 43 Stat. 630) provides that 
rights accrued under prior acts shall be preserved.'' 
Syl. 16----' 'Heirs at law of deceased soldier within permitted 
class of beneficiaries, to whom payments of war risk insur-
ance had been made in absence of designation of beneficiary, 
under War Risk Insurance Act, Oct. 6, 1917, Sec. 402, 40 
Stat. 409, as amended by Act, June 25, 1918, S'ec. 21, 40 Stat. 
615, held entitled, under Act, March 4, 1925, Sec. 2 (38 U. S. 
C. A., Sec. 445 )', to restoration of payments by government, 
where soldier's mother, "rhom government failed to include 
in payments, released government a.nd consented; World \V"ar 
Veteran£3' Act, June 7, 1924, Sec. 303, as amended by Act, 
March 4, 1925, Sec. 14 (38 U. S. C. A., Sec. 514), which re-
quires payment of award to estate, being inapplicable.'' 
The court at page 220, speaking of the original Act of 
.Tune 7, 1924, and the amendment of March 4, 1925, ·says : 
''As originally enacted on ,June 7, 1924, Section 303 merely 
provided that, if no person within the permitted class of bene-
ficiaries survived the insured, or if before the completion of 
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payments the beneficiary o~ beneficiaries should die, there 
·being no surviving person within said permitted class, then 
-the insurance, or the remainder thereof, should be paid to 
the estate of the insured in a lump sum. This covered a 
.very limited . field, being confined to cases where there were 
· no persons within the permitted class who survived the in-
sured in the one case, or who survived the beneficiary in the 
other case. 
''The department had found the long continued monthly 
.payments burdensome, and sought to have it changed to a 
lump sum liquidation plan. Congress by the amendment of 
March 4, 1925, expanded the field covered by Section 303 to 
include additional cases. As thus amended, Section 303, in 
the provision prior to the proviso, was made to cover the 
following cases of award and payment of insurance to de.-
ceased soldiers·: 
"(1) Where no person is designated as beneficiary. 
"(2) Where the designated ·beneficiary does not survive 
the insured. 
'~ (3) Where the designated beneficiary survives the in-
sured, but dies before receiving· all of the 240 installments." 
And further at page 222 the court says: 
''The retroactive words of Section 303 undoubtedly cover 
all policies issued since the enactment of the original law, 
where the insured was alive when Section 303 was amended on 
March 4, 1925, but do not cover the rights of persons within 
the permitted class where the insured died before the amend-
ment of Section 303 became effective on March 4, 1925, with-
out designating a beneficiary, whether or not monthly pay-
ments had been made to his heirs before the passage of the 
amendment. 
· = "Nowhere in its construction of Section 303 by the de-
partment, nor in the brief, does defendant's counsel refer to 
Section 602. That section se·ems to be treated as if nonex-
istent. In its decision of June 29, 1926, the department said : 
'When this discovery (omission of mother from the monthly 
payments) was made, Section 303 had been enacted • • -'" 
and t~ere is no authority of law • • * except Section 303.' 
''In the brief, defendant's counsel says: 'The foregoing 
(Section 303) being the only governing statute, • • • the 
present value of the insurance was payable to the estate of 
the insured under Section 303.' 
''Such statements could only be made upon the theory that 
Section 602 is utterly without effect here, and not even 
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worthy of mention. Even if plaintiffs' award was not in 
course of payment, and the case is thus without the first pro-
viso, plaintiffs' rights are still saved if Section 602 applies. 
If Section 602 is effective in the i.nstant case, defend~nt is 
clearly in error. No reason or argumt::nt, compelling or other, 
has been advanced to ~how that Section 602 is without force 
or validity, or is entirely superseded by or inconsistent with 
the retroactive phrase of Section R03. It is true that there 
are no vested rights running to the beneficiary or persons in 
the permitted class, as was held in White v. U. 8., 270 U. 8. 175, 
46 S. Ct. 27 4, 70 L. Ed. 530. But there are rights arising 
under Section 402 of the former statute, running to such per-
sons, which under Section 602 it is the duty of the court to 
protect, unless it is clear that Congress has legislated to af-
fect those rights: Congress may, doubtless, limit and alter, 
and possibly destroy, such rights. But Congress may also 
preserve and secure them. This latter Congress did,- ab to 
some rights, by the proviso of the Section 303, and as to all 
ea:isting- ri,qhts bJJ Se.ction 602, of the p'resent law.'' 
This seems to be the clear distinction of the rights of the 
parties which Congress has protected. See Section 2295, Vol. 
8, beginning at· page 7467, Couch on Insurance. See Salzer 
?. U. 8., et al., F~d. Rep. 300, page 764. 
Of course, a general provision making· the statute retro-
active gives no power to destroy the obligation of the contract 
when vested. The reservations have relationship to the execu-
tory stages of the performance. 19 R. C. L., pages 1206, 1207, 
Sees. 23 and 24. Such a construction would violate the rights 
of the 'vi dow and child of Talmage P. Taylor under the 5th 
amendment of the Federal Constitution. 12 C. J., page 957, 
Sec. 487. · ·· -
''Retrospective or retroactive legislation is not favored. 
Hence it is a well settled and fundamental rule of statutory 
construction variously stated, that all statutes are to be con-
strued as having only a prospective operation, and not as op-
erating retrospectively. It is equally well settled as a funda-
mental rule of statutory construction supported and estab-
lished by numerous judicial decisions, that statutes are not to 
be construed as having a retroactive effect. * * * Where 
a statute is expressly or by clear implication made retroac-
tive to a certaip. extent or for a certain purpose, the courts 
will not by construction give to it a retroactive operation to 
any greater extent or for any other purpose." 59 C. J., page 
1159, Sec. 692. 
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This rule of construction is especially a_pplicable to this 
case in view of the saving provision of Section 602 of the 
Act, as amended. - -
Speaking of the provisions of the amended statute in the 
case of Hatch v. U. 8., 29 Fed. Rep. (2nd), at page 220, Judge 
Cooper rendering the opinion, referring to the statutes, says : 
''They are, of course, prospective in this respect.'' 
],urthermore, the insurance involved was not assignable 
by Clifford I. Taylor, as provided by the statute, nor could 
he as beneficiary have willed the insurance away to anyone 
else. 
It is seen that the Act of Mareh 4, 1925, amending the Act 
of June 7, 1924, chang·ed the designation of the specific bene-
ficiaries and d.esignated "the estate of the insured"; leaving. 
the commuted value thereof to be administered as ''the estate 
of the insured" under the laws of the State where the prop-
erty can be administered; which, of course, in this case would 
be in the ,State of Virginia. 
Before the amended.Act the authorities uniformly held that 
the commuted value could not be willed by the beneficiary, 
because it was clear if that were permitted then the insurance, 
or a part of it, might be disposed of to other parties than 
those named in the Act, and as the Act specifically restricted 
the parties to whom it should go that if it could be disposed of 
by will that such a happening might change or nullify the ex-
pressed provision of the Act. Cassarello· v. U. 8. (Pa.), 271 
Fed. 486. 
Speaking of the nature of this insurance it is said by Jus-
tice Holmes in the case of White v. U. 8 .• 70 L. Ed. 5BO. at 
page 538 of the opinion: 
''The insurance was a contract, to be sure, for which a 
premium was paid, but it was not one entered into by the 
United States for gain. All soldiers were giv_en a right to 
it, and the relation of the government to them, if not pater-
nal,. was at least avuncular. It was a relation of benevo-
lence established by the government at considerable cost to 
itself, for the soldier's good." 
Since the amendment the question of the right of the bene-
ficiary and heir to will the commuted value has been consid-
ered by the courts. In the case of Kni_qht's Estate (Mo.), 48 
S. W. (2nd) 71, decided in 1932, the court had lmder consider-
ation the right to will the commuted value. This case holds 
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that the unpaid installments of insurance cannot be disposed 
of by will, and reasons thus, at page 73 of the opinion: 
''The World War Veterans' Act, Section 303, as amended, 
Section 514, Title 38, page 1226 U. S. Code of 1925 (38 U. S. 
C. A., Section 514), expressly provides that when the named 
beneficiaries die or become ·disqualified before all monthly 
installments have been paid, the commuted value of the future 
installments shall be paid to the estate of the deceased 
soldier, and this without limitation. That means that 
·when paid, this money for the purpose of distribution, be-
t!Omes the property of the estate and must be distributed un-
der the laws of the State just as any other personal prop-
erty belonging to the deceased at the time of his death is to 
be distributed; and that cuts out the power of any beneficiary 
to control it and require it to be distributed in any other way.'' 
To the same effect is the case of State Ex Rel Lankford v. 
Fidelity, etc., Co. (~Io.), 74 S. W. (2nd), page 904. See opin-
ion at page 911. This case was decided in 1934. Same ruling 
is held in the case of In Be: Morford, 269 N. Y. S. 278. I 
do not have the New York case and cannot tell whether it was 
decided prior to or after the amendment. However, it speaks 
as authority in considering the 'vhole scheme of the insurance. 
Of course, the persons entitled to the commuted value which, 
under the Act. is to be paid to the estate of the insured, are 
to be determined as of the date of his death and not as of 
the date of the death of the beneficiary. Sin.qleton v. Cheek 
(U. 8.), 76 L. Ed. 419; Stacey v. Culbertson (Va.), 160 S. E., 
page 50: Price v. lJfcConnell (Va.), 149 S. E., page 515. 
The effect of the change, therefore, was to substitute the 
specific persons provided by the state statutes instead of ·the 
specific persons designated as beneficiaries in the former 
Federal Acts. 
Furthermore, the will of Clifford I. Taylor in question was 
executed in 1907, and he affixed to it a codicil in 1919 giving 
his widow the proportionate part of his personal property, 
which he conceived the law would have given her in any event. 
At that time so far as the commuted value of the War Risk 
Insurance was concerned this was no more than a possibility 
of reverter, and at best simply passed the commuted value 
by descent cast to the p~rsons who, at the time of the hap-
pening of the conting·ency answered the description of the 
heirs of Samuel R. Taylor, the veteran. Copenhaver v. Pen-
dleton, et al. (Va.)J 155 S. E. 802. .As is said at page 812 
of the opinion : 
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''Upon reason and principle we are of opinion that there 
is no difference in the ways in which at common law a con-
tingent remainder, an executory devise, and a possibility of 
reverter were transmitted by an ancestor to his heir, and 
that at common law a possibility of reverter is an inherit-
able right which passed by descent cast to the person who 
at the time of the happening of the contingency upon which 
it depended then answered the description of heir of the 
creator of the fee upon the determination of which it de-
pended, and that such .Person took as heir and not by repre-
sentation. This is the conclusion which seems to have been 
reached by the Supreme Court of Illinois in North v. Gra-
ham, 235 lll. 178, 85 N. E-. 267, 1R L. R. A. (N. S.) 624, 126 
Am. St. Rep. 189. It is in accord with principle and reason, 
and is not in conflict with any English or Virginia case to 
which our attention has been called.'' 
It is submitted that in his will Clifford I. Taylor did not in-
tend to include this commuted insurance, and in the construc-
tion of the will itself it cannot be considered that he took into 
consideration or had in mind this commuted value. He did 
not, of course, ever possess or have any right of possession 
at all, or right of user to this- commuted value, being the in-
terest of his son, Talmage P. Taylor, in the veteran's es-
tate. 
Section 5236 of the Virginia Code provides : 
''A will shall be construed with reference to the real and 
personal estate comprised in it to speak and take effect as if 
it had been executed immediately before the death of the tes-
tator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.'' 
As is said in the case of Whitehurst v. JtVhite, 160 Va. 859; 
169 S. E. 724: 
''In construing a will the court places itself as near as 
possible in the situation of the testator at the time of the 
execution of the will." 
In the case of B,oive v. Bowe's Administrator, et al. (Va..), 
86 S. E., page 856, the court held that the real estate and 
personal property acquired by the widow from her deceased 
husband was included in the residuary clause of her will, al-
though her will had been executed prior to her husband's 
<.Ieath; but in commenting on this feature of the case the court 
says: 
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''The chief argument relied upon by the appellants in sup-
port of their contention that the will of E·. L. Bowe did not 
dispose of the property received by her under the will of her 
husband, N. W. Bowe, is that her 'vill, or that portion of it 
in which it is claimed that the residuary clause appears and 
under which her three daug·hters were residuary devisees and 
legatees, was written during the lifetime of N. W. Bowe, and 
therefore could not have been in~ended to apply to property 
that passed to her under his will. If this fact stood alone, 
it might have some force, but, 'vhen it is made to appear 
that after the death of her husband all of the real estate 
standing in his name was transferred to her upon the land 
books, that she took possession of it and exercised ownership 
over it, and that the greater part of his personal estate 
passed into her actual p<;>ssession, we cannot doubt that her 
will, which, under the statute, speaks at the time of her death, 
passed all the property, real and personal, to which she was 
entitled, including that which she took under the will of her 
husband." 
Of course, under the statute the will must be construed 
with reference to the real and personal estate comprised 
in it. This is the construction, and which is a general rule 
applied in the case of Hatch v. U. 8., supra, wherein there 
was no question but that the soldier may have executed his 
will as to his insurance, but he had made the will before he 
had enlisted in the army. The court held that his will con-
strued as to his intent at the time could not be read as a will 
of his insurance, as is shown by the above QUotations in this 
case. 
v. 
CONCLU.SION. 
For the foregoing reasons your petitioner respectfully 
prays that an appeal and supersedeas be awarded to the de-
cree complained of, and that the same may be reviewed and 
reversed by this Honorable Court, and petitioner will ever 
pray, etc. 
C. D. TERRY, 
Administrator for Talmage P. Taylor, Deceased. 
By Counsel. 
JAMES S. l{AHLE, 
Counsel for C. D. Terry, Administrator. 
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Virginia, To-wit: 
I, James S. Kahle, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that I have 
read the foregoing petition and examined the transcript of 
the record and exhibits accompanying· the same, and that in 
my opinion there is error in the proceedings and final decree 
therein complained of, and that in my opinion the said de-
eision of the Circuit Court should be re~ewed by this Court 
and reversed under proper order entered herein. 
Given under my hand this 6th day of February, 1936. 
JAMES S. ICAHLE. 
Filed before me Feby. 14, 1936. 
H. B. G. 
March 8, 1936. Appeal and supe1·sedeas awarded by the 
court. No bond required. 
M.B. W. 
RECORD 
In the Circuit Court of Buckingham County, Virginia~ 
G. 1\L Rogers, Adminish·ator of Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, 
v. . 
Charles R. Taylor, William A. Taylor, Maggie E. Giannotti, 
nee Taylor, Virgie V. Taylor, Lewis Williams, Executor of 
C. I. Taylor, deceased, C. D. Terry, Administrator of Tal-
mage P. Taylor, deceased, Frances M. Taylor, and Maggie 
E. Taylor, the last named; being an infant under the age 
of twenty-one years. 
BILL. 
To the Honorable Circuit Court of Buckingham County: 
Your complainant, G. 1\L Rogers, Administrator of Samuel. 
R. Taylor, deceased, would respectfully show unto the Court: 
1. That on September 30, '1918, the decedent, Samuel R. 
Taylor, of the ag·e to-wit: of twenty-eight years, departed 
this life intestate, unmarried, a legal resident of the said 
County {)f Buckingham, while in active service of the United 
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States Navy and 'vhile the Government of the United States 
was engaged in war with Germany. · 
2. That on February 15, 1935, your complainant was duly 
appointed and duly qualified as Administrator of said Samuel 
R. Taylor, deceased, as will more fully appear by a certifi-
cate of the Clerk of said Court herewith attached and filed as 
a part of this bill, marked "Exhibit A". 
3. That at the time of the said death of the said Samuel R. 
Taylor, he carried a War Risk Insurance Policy is-
page 2 r sued by the United States Government, in the sum 
of $10,000.00, in which he designated his father, C. 
I. Taylor, as his sole beneficiary. That the said beneficiary· 
was paid and received under the said policy monthly install-
ments of $5"7 .50 from said September 30, 1918, the date of 
the death of the said insured, to July 29, 1920, such further 
payments being discontinued at the latter date because of the 
death of the said C. I. Taylor, the beneficiary, on July 28, 
1920. 
4. That from July 30, 1920, to March 29, 1934, monthly 
installments of $23.00 were awarded and paid under the said 
policy to Talmage P. Taylor, a whole brother of the said in-
sured, which payments were, however discontinued on March 
29, 1934, because of the death of the said Talmage on March 
24, 1934. 
5. That said Charles R. Taylor, William A. Taylor, and 
Maggie E. Giannotti, nee Taylor, brothers and sister of the 
half-blood of the said Samuel R. Taylor, the insured, have 
each, since the death of the said beneficiary, C. I. Taylor as 
aforesaid on July 28,-1920, received under the said policy 
monthly installments of $11.50, and are still receiving such. 
6. That on March 8, 1935, an award of $1,152.00 under the 
sa.id policy was made to and received by your complainant un-
der the provisions of Sec. 303 of The World War Veterans' 
Act of March 4, 1925, which award was and represented the 
commuted value of the remaining unpaid installments under 
said policy of the share of said Talmage P. Taylor. 
page 3 ~ (a) The facts alleged in the foregoing paragraphs. 
1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, are more fully shown by official cor-
respondence between your complainant and H. L. McCoy, Di-
rector of Insurance, of the Veterans Administration of Wash-
ing·ton, D. C., dated respectively, March 8, 1935, June 28, 1935, 
and July 25, 1935, here,vith attached and filed as a part of 
this bill, marked "Exhibit B. C. D.", respectively. 
7. That said Samuel R. Taylor, who died as aforesaid on 
September 30, 191R, left surviving him as his only heir at 
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law, his said father, the said C. I. Taylor, who was also the 
said insured's designated beneficiary as aforesaid. 
(a) The said .Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, left surviving 
him at th~ time of his death as aforesaid, one whole brother, 
the said Talmage P. Taylor, two brothers of the half blood, 
namely, the said Charles R. Taylor and William A. Taylor, 
and a sister of the half blood, the said J\{aggie E. Giannotti, 
nee Taylor, who are all of the next of class and kin of the 
said Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, and who would have been 
his only heirs at law had not the decedent's said father, the 
said C. I. Taylor survived him as aforesaid. 
8. That the said C. I. Taylor whp departed this life as 
aforesaid on July 28, 1920, left a last will and testament, 
whereby he gave to his wife, the said Virgie V. Taylor, one-
third of all of his personal property, the remainder to the 
said Charles R. Taylor, William A. Taylor and Maggie E. Tay-
lor (who has since married one Giannotti as aforesaid), and 
any other children that may be born by the testator's mar-
riage to the said Virgie V. Taylor, in equal shares, nomi-
nating the said Lewis Williams as his sole executor, all of 
which will more fully appear by a certified copy of 
page 4 ~ said will attached and :filed as a part of this bill, 
marked "Exhibit E". 
(a r That no other children were born or the marriage be-
tween the said testator, C. I. Taylor and Virgie V. Taylor 
than those three specifically named in the will, and that all 
of them are now over the age of twenty-one years. 
9. That the said Talmage P. Taylor who departed this life 
as aforesaid on March 24, 1934, died intestate and a resident 
of the State of West Virginia, leaving surviving him as his 
only heirs at law, his widow, the said Frances M. Taylor, and 
one child, the said Maggie E. Taylor, an infant of about fif-
teen years of age. That C. D. Terry was duly appointed and 
duly qualified as Administrator of the said Talmage P. Tay-
lor, deceased, 'vhich will more fully appear by a certificate 
attached and filed along with this bill, marked ''Exhibit F''. 
10. That your complainant has deposited the said $1,152.00 
which he received as aforesaid in the Lynchburg National 
Bank & Trust Company where it is now deposited save and 
except a small amount he has disbursed for costs. That your 
complainant has no knowledge of any other personal assets 
belonging to the estate of his decendent save and except the 
remaining unpaid shares of the said Charles R. Taylor, Wil-
liam A. Taylor and J\{aggie E. Giannotti under the said War 
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Ri~k Insurance Policy and which are as aforesaid in the 
hands of and control of the Veterans Adnrinistration of Wash-
ington, D. C. · 
11. That a serious doubt is in the mind of your complain-
ant as to whom the money in his hands as afore-
page 5 } said should ·be paid, and he desires and asks for 
the aid, assistance and direction of the Court in 
the full administration of the estate in or to come into his 
hands as aforesid. 
In tender consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your 
complainant is remediless in the premises save by the aid 
of a court of equity, where matters of this kind are alone 
and properly cognizable, he prays that the said Charles R. 
Taylor, William A. Taylor, Maggie E. Giannotti, nee Taylor, 
Virgie V. Taylor, Lewis Williams, Executor of C. I. Taylor, 
deceased, C. D. Terry, Administrator of Talmage P. Taylor, 
deceased, Frances l\L Taylo1~ and Maggie E. Taylor, may be 
made parties defendant to this bill, and required to answer 
the same, but not under oath, answers under oath being ex-
pressly hereby waived; that a proper guardian ad litem. be 
appointed and assigned the infant defendant, Maggie E. Tay-
lor, who is beyond the limits of this Commonwealth to defend 
her interests in this suit, who shall also be required to an-
swer this bill; that proper process issue; that the personal 
estate of the said Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, be adminis-
tered by the Court in this suit and proper distribution thereof 
be ordered and directed by the Court; that the Administra-
tor or complainant be permitted to fully settle before this 
Court his accounts; that a reasonable and proper fee may 
be allowed by the Court to Robert Whitehead and G. M. Rog-
ers, counsel for your complainant, for their services in insti-
tuting and prosecuting this suit; that all proper orders and 
decrees may be made, and that all such other, further and gen-
eral relief may be granted and afforded your com-
. page 6 ~ plainant as the nature of his case may require, or 
to equity shall seem meet. 
And your complainant will ever pray, etc. 
G. M. ROGERS, Admr. 
G. M. ROGERS, 
Administrator of Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, complainant. 
by counsel. 
ROBERT WHITEHEAD and 
G. M:. ROGERS, p. q. 
ROBERT WHITEHEAD and 
G. M. ROGERS, p. q. 
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EXHIBIT A. 
Virginia: In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Buckingham. 
I, Carrie S. Hubard, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Buck-
ingham County, do hereby certify that on the 15th day of Feb-
ruary, 1935, G. M. Rogers duly qualified in my said Court as 
Administrator of Samuel R. Taylor, deed, and gave bond as 
such, according to law. 
Given under my hand, this 15th day of rFebruary, 1935. 
CARRIE .S. HUBARD, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT B. 
PUBLIC VOUCHER 
For Judgments, Lump Sum Insurance, 
and Funds Due Incoll}.petent Beneficiaries 
Voucher ...... . 
Symbol11,647 
Administrative No.-
Identity No. 
30-!,636 
XC-400 
Appropriation: M. & N. Ins. V. A. 1935 & Pr. Yrs. Samuel 
R. Taylo.r (Veteran's name) 
THE UNITED STATES Dr., . 
To G. M. Rogers as Ad.;r. of estate of Samuel R. Taylor, 
deceased, 
Buckingham, Virginia. 
page 7 ~ 3-8-35 Description 
Amount 
Dollars Cents 
Monthly installments of insurance were awarded 
to Father $57.50 from 9/30/18 to 7/29/20 
Payment disc. on acct. of death of beneficiary 
on 7-28-20. ]..fonthly installments Of insur-
ance were awarded to Talmage P. Taylor, 
(Brother) @ $23.00 from 7-30-20 to 3-29-34. 
· Payments disc. on acct. of death of beneficiary .. 
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on 3-24-34. No. inst.allments paid 186. No. 
unpaid 5. %·2;5·or $10,000. 
Remaining installments of insurance due and 
payable under Sec. 303 of the Act of March 4, 
1925. .Sec. 305 not involved. . 
Commuted value of remaining unpaid install-
ments · 
GOD :vg. MAIL WITH CHECK 
l,l-52.00 
1,152 
MEMORANDUM 
Total 
Paid by Check No. 9798, dated Mar. 111935 
EXHIBIT 0. 
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 
Washington 
1,152.00 
1,152.00 
In reply refer to : FCAD 
J nne 28, 1935. 
G. ;:M:. Rogers, Attorney-at-law, 
Buckingham, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: . 
Taylor, Samuel R. 
XC-46,700. 
This office is in receipt of your conmiunication of recent 
date enclosing copy of your communication addressed to Mr. 
James S. Kahle, Attorney-at-la,v, Law and Commerce Build-
ing, Bluefield, West Virginia, under date of June 
page 8 ~ 17, 1935. 
Please be advised that a decision was rendered 
by the United States Supreme Court undQr date of February 
15, 19·32, in the case of Charley Singleton et al. v. Edith Cheek 
nee Jackson et al., 76 L. Ed. 419, 284 U. S. 493, 52 S. Ct. 259, 
that the heirs of the deceased insured soldiers and .sailors of 
the World War are determined as of the date of the death of 
the insured and that War Risk Insurance must be distributed 
the same as any other personal property owned by the insured 
at the date of hiR death. 
The record in this case shows that Samuel R. Taylor, the 
above named deceased sailor died in the active service on 
September 30, 1918, ·a legal resident of the State of Virginia. 
Therefore the lump sum insurance paid in this case to you 
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as Administrator of the estate should be distributed among 
the heirs at law of the deceased insured entitled to take his 
personal property under the intestacy laws of the state of 
his last legal residence, namely, Virginia. · 
You are further advised that distribution is a matter that 
comes under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court· of the 
County of Buckingham, State of Virginia and does not come 
under the jurisdiction of the Veterans Administration 
All future communications relative to this case should 
show the veteran's name and refer to the number XC-46,700. 
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Respectfully, 
H. L. McCOY, 
H. L. McCOY, 
Director of Insurance. 
EXHIBIT D. 
Veterans Administration 
Washington 
July 25, 1935. 
In reply refer to F·CAJ?. 
G. M. Hogers, Attorney, at law, 
Buckingham, Virginia. 
Taylor, Samuel R. 
XC 46 700 
Dear Sir: 
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of J nly 15, 1925, 
requesting a statement regarding the distribution of the in~ 
surance in this case. 
In reply you are advised that the insured, Samuel R. Tay· 
lor, carried insurance in the amount of $10,000 for which he 
designated his father Clifford I. Taylor, as his beneficiary. 
The soldier did not designate any alternate beneficiary nor 
did he leave a last will and testament making further dis· 
tribution of his War Risk Insurance. 
His father received $57.50 a month from September 30, 
1918, to July 29, 1920, Payments were stopped at the latter 
date because of the death of the father on July 28, 1920. 
Talmage P. Taylor died on March 24, 1934, and his unpaid 
share amounting to $1,152.00 was awarded to G. M. Rogers as 
administrator of the veterans estate to be distributed in ac· · 
cordance with the intestacy laws of the state of Virginia. 
The other heirs, those of the half-blood, are receiving their 
26 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
respective shares in monthly installments at the rate of $11.50 
.a month. 
All future communications relative to this case should 
show the veteran's name and refer to the number XC 46 700. 
. . 
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. Respectfully, 
H. L. McCOY, 
H. L. McCOY, 
Director of Insurance. 
EXHIBIT E. 
In the. name of God amen: 
I, Clifford I. Taylor do make this my last will and testa-. 
ment, As follows: I give and bequeath unto my three young-
est children, Maggie ·E. Taylor, William Alton Taylor, and 
Charles Richard Taylor and any other children that may be 
born by union in marriage with my present wife. Virgie V. 
Taylor· that may be living at the time of my death to share 
equally with the above three children mentioned: All of 
my property, personal and real estate of every description 
and class, including money, bonds of every class & description 
and from all sur"ces whatever including life insurance, if any 
there be in force at the time of my death: all interest in any 
real estate that I may be possessed of, at the time of my 
death, all money deposited in bank, if any; Household and 
kitchen furniture of every class and kind;\ all stock, horses 
No 2 
or cattle I make Lewis Williams the the executor of this my 
will and instruct that he qualify as required by law to exe-
cute this trust to have lawful compensation for his services 
out of the proceeds of my estate, and that he allow the house-
hold fixtures to remain in the hands and possession of my 
wife, Virgie V. Taylor until the youngest child becomes 
twenty one years of age ; and he is in no wise held responsible 
for the depreciation in the value of the same by such being 
allowed to remain in her possession. However be is author-
ized to collect all moneys due me from every source what-
ever and to place the same on deposit in some strong reliable 
National Bank, the same to be collected by my said executor 
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and paid over to my children just as they become 
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However, if the said Lewis Williams, my execu-
tor find it necessary to use any part of the money collected 
for the maintenance, support and educating of my children 
mentioned in this writing from time to time he may collect 
No 3 
or cheek from the Bank or the Bank wherein he has the 
money deposited, such sums from time to time as he may 
deem reasonable and just for the demands made and as will 
meet the requirements that are made necessary for the pur-
pose above named. I herein bequeath and give to my two old-
est children, Talmage P. and Samuel R. Taylor one dollar 
each, to be paid to them or their lawful heirs or representa-
tives: I do not give my two oldest sons any more as I have 
heretofore deeded them my real estate on which I now live as 
evidenced by deed of conveyance duly recorded in the Clerk's 
office of Buckingham Co. I want all of my just indebtedness 
fully paid first. Given under my hand this 9th day of J anu-
ary 1907 
CLIFFORD I. TAYLOR 
I Clifford I. Taylor, the within named testator do hereby 
make and publish this codicil to be added to my last will and 
testament, bearing date the . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . 190 .... 
in manner following to-wit: I bequeath to my wife, Virgie 
V. Taylor one third interest in all of my personal property 
of which I may be seized and possessed of at the time of 
my death after the payment of my just debts to pass to her 
in fee simple, the remaining portion of my property to pass 
as set forth in the original will, the same executor to execute 
this codicil as named in the original will. I am also im-
pressed under the law my wife would be entitled 
page 12 ~ to this share of my estate if it were not in writ-
ing. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my 
hand and seal this 28th day of ,July 1919. 
CLIFFORD I. TAYLOR (Seal) 
Virginia: 
In the ·Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Buckingham 
County, on August 5th, 1920, In Vacati~n. . 
28 Supreme Court of Ap:peals of Virginia. 
. . 
This day. a paper purporting to be the holographic will of 
C. I. Taylor deceased, was presented before the Clerk of 
said Court and on the testimony of Lewis Williams & John 
B. Boatwright, they haying first been sworn to testify, they 
stating that they were familiar with the handwriting of C. I. 
Taylor, and verily believed that the paper & signature there-
to was entirely 'vritten & signed in the handwriting of said 
C. I. Taylor. 
Therefore it is considered that the will is duly proved as 
required by law and is ordered to be recorded as the true 
last will and testament of C. I. Taylor deceased, the Testa-
tor havin~ designated and appointed Lewis "\Villiams as his 
executor In his said will. On the motion of Lewis Williams 
it ·is ordered that certificate is granted him for obtaining 
letters of administration of the estate of the said decedent 
in due form. 
·Thereupon, Lewis Williams with United States :Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., as his surety entered into and acknowledged 
a bond in the penalty of $2,000.00 payable to the Common-
wealth and conditioned as required by law, and took the oath 
prescribed by law. R. J. Newton, Jno. Banton and W. R. 
Gough are hereby appointed appraisers, who after first being 
duly sworn shall appraise the personal estate of the said de-
cedent and file their report with the Commissioner 
page 13 ~ of Accounts of this Court. · 
Given under my hand this 5th day of Aug., 1920. 
Teste: 
W. J. HUBARD, Clerk. 
• I 
A Copy-Teste : 
CARRIE S. HUBARD, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT F. 
West Virginia: 
At an regular adjourned session of the County Court, con-
tinued and held for the County of Mercer, at the Courthouse 
thereof, on Monday, February 11, 1935. · 
Present: L. J. Beleher, President. 
Present: C. E. Morgan, Commissioner. 
Present : C. I. Johnson, Commissioner. 
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This day on motion of Mrs. Frances M. Taylor, widow of 
Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, by her writing duly filed nomi-
nating and requesting the appointment of C. D. Terry as 
administrator of the estate of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased. 
Upon which said motion it is ordered that C. D. Terry be 
and he is hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the 
said Talmage P. Taylor, deceased. 
Whereupon C. D. Terry appeared in open court and took 
the oath required by law as such administrator and together 
with New Amsterdam Casualty Oompany, as his surety, en-
tered into and acknowledged a bond in the penalty of Fif-
teen Hundred Dollars, conditioned as required by law, which 
said bond is approved in open court and ordered to be re-
corded. 
Upon motion of C. D. Terry administrator of 
page 14 ~ the estate of Talmage P. T~ylor, deceased, it is 
ordered that D. E. Terry, J. R. Belcher, and J. T. 
Hambrick, be and they are hereby appointed appraisers of 
the estate of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, who shall, after 
being duly sworn, appraise the estate aforesaid and return 
an inventory of the same, duly signed by them to A. M. Sut-
ton, one of the Commissioners of Accounts of said County, 
to which said Commissioner this estate has been referred as 
provided by law. 
State of West Virginia, 
County of Mercer, to-wit: 
I, Lowery G. Bowling, Clerk of the County Court of the 
County aforesaid, do hereby certify that the foregoing writ-
ing is a true and correct copy of an order as taken from the 
records of my said office. 
Given under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 12th 
day of February, 1935. 
(Seal) LOWERY G. BOWLING, 
Clerk 1\fercer County Court. 
ANSWER. 
The answer of C. D. Terry, Administrator of the Estate 
of Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, to the Bill of Complaint ex-
hibited against him and others by G. M. Rogers, Adminis-
trator of Samuel R. Taylor, deceased, complainant in the 
above cause: 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
To the Honorable Circuit Court of Buckiugha~ County: 
··For. answer to the said bill of complaint, C. D. Terry, Ad-
. ministrator of Talmage P. Ta~lor, deceased, an-
page 15 } ~wering says that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
· . of the said bill of complaint are true so far as this 
defendant is advised. 
Answering. Paragraph 7 this defendant says that it is true 
that thei said Samuel R. Taylor died intestate on the 30th 
day of September,. 1918, leaving aurviving him his father, 
C. I. Taylor, who is also the said insured's designated bene-
ficiary, and . that the said Sam:uel R. Taylor at the time of 
his death also left surviving him his brother Talmage P. Tay-
lor, a whole brother, and two brothers of the half blood, 
C~arles R. ~aylor and William A. Taylor, and one sister of 
the .half blood, 1\faggie E •. Giannotti (nee Taylor), and that 
there were no other brothers or sisters of the said Samuel 
R. Taylor thereafter born; . that after the death of the said 
C. I. Taylor, the father, the said Talmage P. Taylor, whole 
brother, and the said Charles R. Taylor; William A. Taylor 
and Maggie E. Giannotti then became the sole heirs at law 
of the said Samuel R. Taylor as of the time of his death and 
entitled to -his estate as provided by law; that after the death 
of the said C. I. Taylor the remaining insurance on the life 
of the said Samuel R. Taylor then became the estate of the 
said Samuel R. Taylor for distribution as unadministered 
assets of said estate. 
Answering Paragraph 8 this defendant says that it is true 
'the said .C. I. Taylor departed this life on the 28th day of 
July, 1~20, and this defendant is advised that he left a last 
will and testament as recited in said-Paraaraph 8, but this· 
defendant here says that the said C. I. Tayior could not dis-
pose of the remaining insurance of the said Samuel 
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terest in the same, and under the law the remain-
ing insurance passed as the estate of Samuel R. Taylor, de-
cease_d, after the death of t;he said C. I. Taylor the named 
beneficiary, to be distributed as the unadministered estate 
of the said Samuel R. Taylor, deceased. 
Answering Paragraph 9 of said bill of complaint this de-
fend~nt says that it is true_that the said Talmage P. Taylor, 
departed this lif.e on March 24,. 1934, intestate, and a. resi-
dent ·of the State of West Virginia, leaving surviving him as 
~is o:Q.ly heirs at law the said Francis :M. Taylor and one child 
the said Margie E. Taylor, an infant fifteen years of age at 
this time~ and that the said C. D. Terry, the defendant herein, 
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was duly appointed and duly qualified as Administrator of 
the estate of the said Talmage P. Taylor, deceased, and he 
is now entitled to receive the personal estate of the said Tal-
mage P. Taylor, deceased, for administration. 
Further answering as to Paragraph 10 this defendant 
says that he presumes the allegations therein are true. 
And now for further information to the court this defend- . 
ant further answering says that immediately following the 
death of the said C. I. Taylor, deceased, the said Talmage 
P. Taylor was duly awarded the amount due to him from the 
estate of his brother Samuel R. Taylor by the Federal B·u-
reau of War Risk Insurance at Washington, D. C., by the 
authority of the Director of the said Bureau, on the 11th day 
o£ July, 1921, and he here files the said written award marked 
"Exhibit Award Bureau of War Risk Insurance to Talmage 
P. Taylor", and prays that the same may be con-
page 17 ~ sidered as a part of his answer. 
This defe'ndant further answering says that un-
der the laws of Virginia as well recognized and generally ad-
mitted and which is the general law of the case, the defend-
ant is entitled to receive the full amount of the Eleven Hun-
dred and Fifty-two Dollars ($1,152.00) commuted insurance, 
payable to the estate of the said Talmage P. Taylor as afore-
said. 
And no'v having fully answered said bill of complaint this 
defendant prays to be hence dismissed with his reasonable 
costs in this behalf expended, and he will ever pray, etc. 
C. D. TERRY, 
Administrator of the Estate of Talmage 
P. Taylor, Deceased. 
. By: JAMES S. KAHLE, 
His Counsel. 
JAMES S. KAHLE, 
Counsel for 0. D. Terry, Administrator. 
State of West Virginia, 
County of ~{ercer, To-wit: 
I I ~ 
C. D. Terry, Administrator of the Estate of Talmage P. 
Taylor, deceased, one of the defendants named in the fore-
~oing and attached answer, being first duly sworn, on his 
oath '-says that the facts and allegations therein contained are 
true, except so far as they are therein stated to be on in-
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
formation, and so far as they are therein stated to be on in-
fQrmation he believes them to be true. 
C. D. TERRY, 
Administrator of the Estate of Talmage 
P. Taylor, Deceased. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me and given under my 
hand and official seal this 31st day of August, 1935. 
page 17 } My commission expires February 18, 1943. 
ELSIE WALK, 
(Seal) Notary Public, Mercer County, 
West Virginia. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance 
Award to Beneficiary 
Yearly Renewable Term Insurance 
To: Mr. Talmage P. Taylor, 
You are hereby notified that, as the person named as bene-
, ficiary by Samuel R. Taylor, C. B. M. USN to whom insur-
ance in .the amount of $10,000 was issued by the United States 
under the act of Congress of October 6, 1917, and the amend-
ments thereto, you are entitled to receive insurance in pay-
ments of twenty-three and 00/100 dollars per month from the 
3oth dav of July, 1920, to the 30th day of Sept., 1938. 
In the event of your death prior to the date last men-
tioned, the remaining unpaid installments of insurance will 
be paid to those persons within the permitted class of spouse, 
child, grandchild, parent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, 
niece, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, of the deceased sol-
dier, as would under the laws of the State of his residence 
be entitled to his personal property in case of intestacy, pro-
vided, however, that if t4e insured designated an alternate 
beneficiary or beneficiaries, the remaining payments will be 
paid to ·such person or persons. If no person within the 
permitted class survives, the remaining installments shall be 
paid to the estate of the last surviving person within the per-
mitted class. 
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Sec. 28. That allotments and family allowances, compen-
sation and insurance payable under Articles II, III, IV, re-
spectively, shall ·not be assignable; shall not be subject to 
the claims of creditors pf any .person to whom an award is 
made under the articles II, III or IV; and shall be exempt 
from all taxation; Provided, That such allotments and family 
allowances, compensation, and insurance shall be subjeet to 
any claims which the United States may have, under Articles 
II, III and IV, against the person on whose account the al-
lotments and family allowances, compensation, or insurance 
is payable. 
If you should change your present address, the Compen-
sation and Insurance Claims Division, Bureau of War Risk 
Insurance, Washington, D. C., must be immediately notified. 
All future communications with reference to this case must 
bear the Compensation number C.-46700. Your check will 
leave this bureau in approximately fourteen days. 
By authority of- the Director : 
This 11th day of July, 1921. 
LEON FRASER, 
Assistant Director in Charge of Compensation 
and Insurance Claims Division. 
CC Form 552 · 
By A. C. D. 
''EXHIBIT AWARD BUREAU OF WAR RISK INSUR-
ANCE TO TALMAGE P. TAYLOR.'' 
ANSWERS. 
The answer of Forrest Guthrie, Jr., guardian ad litem, ap-
pointed to defend Margie E. Taylor, the infant defendant in 
this suit, in proper person, and the answer of said 
page 19 ~ Margie E. Taylor, the infant defendant by her said 
guardian ad litem, to a bill in equity filed against 
said Margie E. Taylor and others in the Circuit Court of 
Buckingham ·County, Virginia. 
The respondent, Forrest Guthrie, Jr., guardian ad litem in 
porper person, and Margie E. Taylor by her said guardian 
ad litem do answer and say that said-Maggie E. Taylor is an 
infant of tender years and not able to understand and to · 
protect her rights as to the matters alleged in the bill, and 
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they pray for full protection of the court for the said Margie 
E. Taylor, the infant defendant. Ana now having fully answered the complainant's bill; they 
pray to be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs by 
them in this behalf expended. 
FORRESfi' GUTHRIE, JR., 
Guardian ad litem for Margie E. Taylor, 
infant defendant. 
MARGIE E. TA.YLOR, 
By FORREST GUTHRIE, JR., 
Her Guardian ad litem. 
DECREE OCT. TERM, 1935. 
The bill in this cause which appears to have been duly filed 
at the second September, 1935, rules, in which it is alleged 
that the infant defendant, the daughter of Talmage P. Tay-
lor, deceased, is named Maggie E. Taylor, and such alleged 
named infant by· error having been made a party defendant, 
and the Clerk of this Court at the time of the institution of 
the suit, upon motion, having ·appointed Forrest Guthrie, 
,Jr., a discreet and competent attorney at law, guardian ad 
litem for such alleged named infant defendant, but 
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name of such infant is Margie E. Taylor and that 
she is beyond the limits of this Commonwealth, the Court 
doth hereby appoint the said Forrest Guthrie, Jr., a discreet 
and competent attorney at law, guardian ad litem for the said 
infant defendant, Margie E. Taylor, which infant is, upon 
motion of the complainant made a party defendant to the 
bill of complaint and required to answer the same, and the 
said guardian ad litem is hereby directed to faithfully repre-
sent the interests of the said infant defendant for whom he is 
hereby appointed. 
Whereupon the said Forrest Guthrie, Jr., guardian ad 
litem, having accepted the said appointment, moved the Court 
for leave to ·file his answer in proper person as such guardian 
ad litem and the answer of the said infant defendant by him 
her said guardian ad litem, which motion the Court granted, 
and accordingly the said answers were this day filed, the 
said. cause being on the docket of this Court and ready for 
hearing. 
Enter: 
ROBERT F. HUTCHESON. 
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In the Circuit Court of Buckingham County, Virginia. 
DECREE OF DEC. 10, 1935. 
This cause having regularly matured at rules and on the 
docket of this court ready for hearing at its October term, 
1935, came on to be heard on the 18th day of October, of said 
term, on the bill of the complainant, the answer of C. D. 
Terry, Administrator of Talmage P. Taylor, de-
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Guthrie, Jr., guardian ad litem for Margie E. Tay-
lor, the infant defendant, and the answer of said infant de-
fendant by her said guardian ad litem, process upon all par-
ties appearing to have been duly issued, the legal and timely 
service of such having been accepted and acknowledged by 
all of the adult parties defendant, and was arg11ed by coun-
sel and submitted to the court as aforesaid at its October term, 
1935; for its decision and decree. 
It appearing to the court ·that the insured and decedent, 
SatUUel R. Taylor, departed this life intestate and unmarried 
-()D eeptember 30, 1918, a resident of the County of Bucking-
Pam., State of Virginia, and that he then carried a War Ri~k 
ln.surance Policy issued by the United States Government, in 
the sum of $10,000.00, in which the insured designated his 
father, C. I. Taylor, as his sole beneficiary; that the said 
beneficiary w;;u:; paid and received under said policy monthly 
instalhnents of $57.50 from the time of the said death of the 
insured until July 29, 1920, the said beneficiary departing 
this life. testate, on July 28, 1920; that from July 30, 1920, 
to Mar.ch 29, 1934, monthly installments of $23.00 under said 
policy were awarded Talmage P. Taylor, a whole brother 
of tlie insured, which were discontinued on said March 29, 
19.34, because of the death of the said Talmage P. Taylor 
Qn March 24, 1934; that monthly installments under said 
policy after the death of the said C. I. Taylor were awarded 
unto the insured's two half brothers and half sisters, namely, 
Charles R. Taylor, William A. Taylor and Maggie E. Gian-
notti, of $11.50 each, and that they are now still 
page 22 ~ receiving such awards; that on said September 30, 
1918, the time of the said insured's death, his 
father, the said C. I. Taylor, was his only heir at law; that 
the next of kin and class of the said insured were his said 
whole brother, two half brothers and sister; that to-wit: on 
March 8, 1935, the remaining installments of said insurance 
which would have been paid to the said Talmage. P. Taylor 
had he survived himself, amounting to $1,152.00, were paid 
in a lump sum to G. M. Rogers, Administrator of said in-
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sured, the complainant, under the provisions of Sec.· 303 of 
the World War Veterans' Act of ]\{arch 4, 1935: Upon ·Con-
sideration Whereof, the written memorandum of decision of 
the court under date of November 26, 1935, is hereby directed 
by the Clerk of this court to be filed and put with the papers 
of the cause, and is hereby made a part of the record thereof, 
the court doth adjudge, order and decree, that the said Ad-
ministrator, shall, after paying all of the unpaid costs of 
the administration and of this suit, including a commission 
of 5% on the fund of $1,152.00 he received, amounting to 
$57.60, to himself, and a fee of $75.00 to Robert vVhitehead 
and G. M. Rogers, Attorneys, for their services in institut-
ing and conducting this suit, and a fee of $5.00 to Forrest 
Guthrie, Jr., for his services as guardian ad litem in repre-
senting the infant defendant, Margie E. Taylor, pay one-third 
of the remainder to Virgie V. Taylor, and the residue thereof 
shall be paid in equal shares unto said Charles R. Taylor, 
William A. Taylor and Maggie E. Giannotti, beneficiaries in 
the will of the said C. I. Taylor, deceased, the said 
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, last named three being all of the children born of 
the marriage between said testator and said Virgie V. Taylor, 
all of said children now bein~ over the age of twenty-one 
years, it appearing that LeWis ·Williams, Executor of the 
said C. I. Taylor, does not now desire to receive the. money 
4imself as such, he having settled his accounts as such and 
the surety on his bond having been discharged and relieved 
from further liability, it also appearing that there are no 
creditors of the said C. I. Taylor and that no person will be 
injured by directing that the said money be paid directly as 
aforesaid bv G. lti. Rogers, Administrator, promptly and 
without dehiy, to the said beneficiaries in said will of C. I. 
Taylor, deceased. .. 
And the said G. M. Rogers, Administrator, shall make re-
port to court of his actions hereunder. . 
The defendant, C. D. Terry, Administrator of Talmage P. 
Taylor, deceased, by his attorney, James S. Kahle, indicating 
his ·intention of appealing, this decree is suspended for a 
period of sixty days from the rising of this court, provided 
that the said. C. D. Terry, Administrator, or some one for 
him, shall, within :fifteen days from the rising of this court; 
enter into a proper bond before the Clerk of this court with 
a surety to be aproved by said Clerk, in the penalty of $200.00, 
payable and conditioned as the law directs. . 
Enter: 
ROBT. F. HUTCHESON. 
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In ~he Circuit Court of Buckingham County. 
Samuel R. Taylor's Admr. 
v. 
Charles R. Taylor,. et als. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION. 
Without setting out the facts in this case, which are nn· 
disputed, the following is a brief memorandum of the con-
clusion reached by the court as to the principles which govern 
its decision: 
(1) When Samuel R. Taylor, the soldier, died in 1918, the 
monthly in,stallments of $57.50 each became payable to his 
father, Clifford R. Taylor, the beneficiary named in the policy, 
and they w·ere so awarded and paid by the War Risk Bureau 
as long as he lived. The right to receive these payments as 
beneficiary was not assignable, nor did the beneficiary, as such, 
have any vested estate in future payments which could be 
disposed of by will, or which would pass under the statute 
of descents and distributions. 
(2) Upon the death of Clifford I. Taylor in 1920, under Sec. 
15 of the ·war Risk Insurance Amending' Act of 1919, the 
monthlJJ payments provided in the policy were properly 
awarded to insured's brother, Talmage P. Taylor, and his 
half brothers and sister, Chas. R. and Wm. A. Taylor and 
1\{aggie Giannotti. This award, however, did not in their 
· case any more than in that of the original beneficiary, give 
these parties a vested right in installments not due or paid, 
or which mig·ht become payable after their deaths. The lan-
guage of Sec. 15, unde.r which the award wa.s· made, is as 
follows: · 
"If any person to whom such yearly renewable term in-
surance has been awarded dies, • * • before all of 
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the monthly installments, payable and applicable, 
shall be payable to such person or persons, 'Within the per-
mitted class of beneficiar~es as would under the laws of the 
State of residence of the insured be entitled to his personal 
property in case of intestacy.'' 
(3) The act of ·Congress of June 7, 1924, known as the 
World War Veterans' Act, repealed Sec. 15 above referred to, 
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and substituted in its place the following (Sec. 303) inap-
plicable parts omitted: 
"If the designated beneficiary survives the insured ·and 
dies prior to receiving all of the 240 installments, there shall 
be paid to the estate of the in,sured the present value of the 
monthly installments thereafter payable.'' 
This section was made retroactive by its last sentence, which 
reads : ''This section shall be deemed to be in effect as of 
Oct. 6, 1917." There was, however, a saving clause for the 
benefit. of·those already receiving payments under Sec. 15 of 
the old Act, as follows: 
·Provided, that all awards of yearly renewable term insur-
ance which are in course of payment on the date of the ap-
proval of this Act shall continue until the death of the per-
son receiving such payments. When any person to whom 
such insurance is now awarded dies, then there shall be· paid 
to the estate of the insured the present value of the remain-
ing unpaid monthly installments so awarded to such per-
son.'' 
Under the mandate of this section the present value of the 
remaining unpaid monthly installments of the 
page 26 ~ award to Talmage P. Taylor have been properly 
a'varded by the War Risk Bureau to the "estate 
of the insured", Samuel R. Taylor, and the money is now 
in the hands of his administrator, to be administered under 
the law of his residence. If Chas. R. Taylor, Wm. A. Taylor, 
or Maggie Giannotti should die before receiving the full 240 
payments, the present value of the remaining unpaid install-
ments awarded to them will follow the same course. 
Sec. 602 of the Act of June 7, 1924, providing that the re-
peal of the War Risk Insurance Act ''shall not affect any 
act done or any right or liability accrued before the said re:-
peal", has no application. The award to Talmage P. Tay-
lor before repeal of the Act was only of 'IM'I~thly install-
ments, and gave him no right to, or vested interest in, pay-
.ments accruing after his death. 
The power of Congress to make these changes in the law, 
and to make them retroactiv-e. has been upheld by all the. 
courts before which the question has come. The Supreme 
Court of the United States in 11'hite v. U. S., 270 U. 8. 175, 
speaking through Mr .• Justice Holmes, held that the con-
tract of insurance in these cases was not entered into by the 
United States for gain; that it 'vas an arrangement "of· 
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benevolence established by the government at considerable 
cost to itself for the soldier's good; that the only contract 
relations were between the soldier and the government; and 
that all others receiving benefits were volunteers, receiving 
their payments as a matter of bounty, subject to the terms 
of the original contract which expressly reserved to Con-
gress the right to make any changes it might see fit in the 
terms and conditions of payment. 
( 4) Being assets of the estate of the insured, 
page 27 ~ the money in controversy here should go, after the 
payment of costs of administration and the costs 
of this suit, including a reasonable fee to counsel, to those who 
answered the descriptio"n of distributees. of .. his personal es-
tate as of the date of his death, and not as of the date of the 
death of the b~neficiary. This is the holding of the Supreme 
Court of the U. S., and of all State Courts except Kentucky. 
The cases on the point were cited in argument, and need not 
be enumerated here. When Samuel R. Taylor died in 1918, 
his father, Clifford I. Taylor, was his sole heir and distributee, 
and upon the instant of his death became seized of a vested in-
terest in all his estate, real and personal, and whether then in 
existence· or thereafter to be realized. And this· is so as to 
the money in controversy, notwithstanding the fact that the 
law which gave it to him, by decreeing that unpaid monthly 
installn1ents should be commuted and paid to the estate of 
the insured, had not at that·time been passed. When it was 
passed it was made retroactive, and spoke as if it had been in 
existence when Samuel R. Taylor died. Since Clifford I. Tay-
lor had then, at the time of his death, this vested interest in 
the money in controversy, it passed under his will, and must 
be paid to L. E. Williams, his executor. 
The two Virginia cases of Price v. McConnell, and Stacy v. 
Culbertson agree on their statement of the law and are in har· 
mony with the Supreme Court of the United States, but in 
: Price v. McConnell, the court :failed to make a correct hppli· 
: cation of the la\v to tllefiiCts. ~ - ~ 
When Arthur Price, the soldier, died in 1918, his 
page 28 ~ father, W. H. Price, was his sole heir and distribu-
tee and became the owner of all his estate, present 
'. and future. When W. H. Price died intestate in 1924, it all· 
! passed to his widow and children. The court gave it to the 
: children as heirs of Arthur Price (which they never were), / 
.. and excluded the widow, thus going in the face of the law t/ 
i which it had just enounced. In Stacy v .. Culbertson, the court 
undertook to excuse, or harmonize, this decision in Price v. 
1, McConnell by saying that Ida B. Price was excluded because 
i W. H. Price died before the Act of June 7, 1924, and she was 
I 
40 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
not then within the permitted class of distributees-an explan-
ation which does not explain, because contrary to both law and • 
fact, She was within the permitted class, and sfie: was entitled 
to her share under the law as widow of W. H. Price-not as an 
heir of Arthur Price. .A:nd in SingletQin v. Cheek the Supreme 
Court of the U .. S. said, "By that amendment the rule which 
limited the benefit of the unpaid installments to persons within 
the designated class of permittees, was abandoned, and the 
estate of the insured was wholly substituted as the payee". 
In so far as the conclusion reached m Price v. McConnell 
are in conflict with Stacy v. Oulbertsot~, they are necessarily 
overruled by the latter case . 
. ROBERT F. HUTCHESON. 
November 26, 1935. 
page 29 ~ I, Carrie S. Hnbard, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Buckingham County, hereby certify that the fore-
going is a true. copy of the record in the case of G. M. Rogers, 
Administrator of Samuel R. Traylor, deceased, v. Charles R. 
Taylor et als., and I further certify that the notice required 
by law was duly given to the Plaintiff. 
Given under my hand his 7th day of January, 1936. 
Teste: 
. CARRIE S.. HUBARD, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
:M. B. WATTS., C. C. 
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